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Abstract
In hotly contested product categories dominated by a few powerful firms, it is quite common
for weaker or late entrants to focus only on particular segments of the whole market. The
rationale for such strategy is intuitive: to avoid direct confrontation with heavy-weight firms,
and to concentrate in segments where these weaker firms have comparative advantages. In
marketing, this is what people called “go niche or go home”. The niche-building strategy
may rely on “homophily”, which implies that consumers in a particular market segment might
possess certain set of attributes that cause them to appreciate certain products better (in other
words, weaker firms would customize their products to target some particular market segments
and not the mass market). On the other hand, the niche-building strategy may also rely on
the network effect, which implies that consumers having social relationship would reinforce
each other via their respective adoptions. In this case, weaker firms should recognize such
inter-customer network and concentrate only on customers belonging to certain set of strategic
clusters.
In this thesis, we present the model for building effective niche-seeking strategies as a se-
quential adversarial search problem (game) on an infinite horizon. For simplicity, we assume
that the adoption choice depends only on the network effects (in other words, a customer will
choose the product that is chosen by the majority of her neighbor). The social network is di-
rected, and there will be two firms, one with significantly more marketing budget than the other
firm. Firms take turns making investment choices on which customer to convert. For both firms,
their budgets are fixed over time and unused budget will not carry over to future time periods.
Furthermore, we introduced a contractual lock-in constraint to represent an obligatory policy
imposed by companies for preventing their customers from defecting to adversary’s product
choice. With this model, we manage to show that a simple strategy based on the evaluation of
individual customer’s “value” can effectively identify and secure niches within randomly gen-
erated scale-free networks. We also show that such niche-building strategy indeed performs
better in the long run than a myopic strategy that only cares about immediate market gains.
We deployed the Minimax approach to strategically reason the two node selection strategy,
and employed a simple α− β pruning mechanism to improve search performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social systems have been shown to be an important factor in affecting consumption behav-
ioral patterns since the 1960s. The seminal work by Bass [2] marks the dawn of an era where
researchers begin to explore the significance of networks in explaining or predicting product
adoptions or innovation diffusions. The Bass model is closely related to the work on net-
work externality in economics (e.g., see [5]) in that it adopts a macroscopic view, investigating
adoptions or diffusions at the industry level. In the Bass model, the impact of networks is ag-
gregated as the count on previous adopters, and the future adoption is then a function of this
aggregated count. The simple and elegant Bass model was later expanded to model adoptions
of products with successive generations (e.g., high-tech products like DRAMS or consumer
electronics) [16] and diffusion process with decision variables (e.g., price) [18] as well.
With the prevalence of technologies and devices that can accurately capture the digital traces
of an individual (e.g., smartphones or social network sites like Facebook) recently, it becomes
increasingly plausible to investigate adoption or diffusion processes at microscopic level. Now
researchers are able to investigate and infer the micro-structures that are behind these macro-
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outcomes instead of fitting the observed statistics at macro-levels. Such micro-structural in-
sights can be utilized to explicitly describe ripple effects of adoption or diffusion among in-
terconnected individuals, and this lead to the intensive study of cascading phenomenon. In
particular, researchers are studying how one could maximize the influence/ diffusion/ adop-
tion in a given network through a targeted set of individuals which was well defined as the
influence maximization problem by [12]. More concretely, given a directed weighted graph, G
=(V,E,W ) with vertices V as users, edgesE as relationships with weight function W: E→[0,1]
which denotes the influence probabilities, the goal is to select a subset S ⊆ V for initiating the
diffusion process so as to maximize σ(S), the number of vertices influenced by S at the end of
diffusion process. The dynamics of influence propagation can be represented by one of many
existing models, such as the linear threshold model, general threshold model and utility based
model. Most of the propagation models in literature assume progressive activation in which
an activated node cannot revert back to inactive mode. This assumption implied a consumer is
unable to change his choice after an initial purchase, which is rarely practical in the context of
business marketing.
In this thesis, the classical influence maximization problem is extended by introducing an
adversary to the model and relaxing the assumption on progressive activation. This research is
motivated by an emerging e-Commerce practice known as influencer marketing, which chan-
nels marketing focus (i.e. invests) on specific key individuals, known as influencers, instead
of targeting the mass in conventional marketing strategies. The main idea is to generate sub-
stantial awareness and subsequently possible sales from potential buyers which surround these
influencers. The influencers serve as conduit to the entire buyer segment, and are perceived as
individuals who shape the purchasing decisions of true potential buyers. Since all marketers are
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aware of such phenomena and may deploy the same practice to compete in the same market,
it might eventually lead marketers to engage the same group of key individuals in a repeated
manner. It is therefore essential, from a marketer’s perspective, to design a marketing strategy
(to perform influence maximization) strategically in the presence of adversary.
In this thesis, the study is narrowed to a duopoly market where two players (called the
Incumbent/Adversary and the Entrant) competing for their respective market shares on a single
product. Each player is endowed with a marketing budget, and is engaged in investing in
customers with that budget over an infinite horizon. Of particular interest in this thesis is
the assumption that the adversary is endowed with a higher budget. The natural question to
ask is whether the entrant has the ability to target customers strategically to secure a niche
consumer segment by fortifying the consumers choice through influence propagation effect.
Our problem departs from the classical Influence Maximization Problem which studies how
one could maximize her consumer segment by targeting a set of individuals to reinforce the
consumers product choice.
Our problem is modeled as a two-player influence maximization problem under an infinite
horizon. Both the Incumbent and Entrant are assumed to have the information about each other
budget. The choice of consumers is governed by its utility, which comprises of network influ-
ence effect and investment on it (if any). Furthermore, a contractual lock-in constraint which
prevents a customer from defecting to opponent’s product choice within a pre-determined time
period is introduced to the model. A minimax algorithm which allows players to reason strate-
gically on which customers to invest at each time period is used to solve this problem, under the
assumption that neither players are aware of the exact node selection policy used by the oppo-
nent. The above game is played sequentially, and the goal is to determine whether some form
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of steady state could be reached, and if so, whether the proposed value-based approach will
exhibit a niche-seeking behavior that enables the Entrant to secure a larger share by targeting
the niche market at steady state. Our results illustrated empirically that, under the tested con-
ditions, the proposed value-based approach is niche-seeking in nature, and can indeed secure a
larger pool of customers (performs better than the conventional count-based greedy approach)
when competing against a stronger opponent.
In general, this research offers a broader view on the dynamics of competition between two
players and how a collective behavior will emerge from changes in individual characteristics in
an influence network under bounded rationality.
1.1 Problem Definition
The rules of game, players’ role, their decision model and information sets are defined as
follow. Our game model is comprised of non zero-sum, pure strategies, sequential two-players
competition game with network influence. The objectives of both players are to maximize their
respective number of adopters within the network. The structure of consumer markets is set to
conform to scale free network topology which is conjectured to be a good representation for
most social network structure. Both players have complete information of the ply depth used
by their opponent but incomplete information about the type of node selection policy will be
used by each other. The Incumbent player assumes her adversary (Entrant player) to deploy
a simplistic count based approach. Each player gets to take a lead in starting the game in
instigating persuasive incentive on a consumer based on her decision model, and her opponent
will perform the same subsequently after observing the new game state. The game will repeat in
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this manner until either one of the following termination criteria is met. The termination criteria
are, 1) repetition of game state and 2) four hundred game stage is played with no repetition of
game state observed. Both players are forbade from targeting the same consumer within a
specified game stages. We termed this constraint as contractual lock-in in this thesis.
1.2 Motivation
Our research is motivated by a new business practice known as influencer marketing which
channels the focus to specific key individuals, influencers, within a group instead of target-
ing the mass in conventional marketing strategies. The main idea is to generate substantial
awareness and subsequently possible sales from potential buyers whom surround these influ-
encer. The influencers serve as conduit to the entire buyers segment, and perceive as people
who shape the purchasing decision of true potential buyers. Since all marketers are aware of
such phenomena and may deploy the same practice to compete in the same market. This will
eventually lead the marketers to engage the same group of key individuals in a repeated man-
ner. Therefore it is essential to explore an alternative strategic approach in focus on securing
a niche consumer segment by fortifying the consumers choice through influence propagation
effect. Our problem departs from the traditional Influence Maximization Problems by studying
how one could maximize the niche (loyal) consumer segment by targeting a set of individuals
to reinforce the consumer adoption choice. Our research amalgamated the two-players game
with an extension of the classical influence maximization problem. The main ingredients com-
prised two competing players, non zero-sum, pure strategy, sequential influence maximization
in a special case of oligopoly market structure. Both the Incumbent and Entrant are assumed
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to have complete but imperfect information of their opponent. The players are aware of the
game tree search algorithm deployed by others but both are unaware of the exact node selec-
tion policy used by their adversary. In the context of standard game, we are unaware of any
clear formalism that described and modeled our problem in such a manner so far.
Here we wish to illustrate the significance of our work using a simple example as follow.
Suppose that the telecommunication service provider, Singapore Telecom ST comes up with
a new ”cloud” and attempts to sell this service through influencer marketing leveraging on the
advantage of social network, such as Twitter, Facebook or other form of social networking
platform. The conventional influence cascading models (e.g. linear threshold, general thresh-
old, independent cascade, weighted cascade, decreasing cascade, and history sensitive models)
provided a mean to identify the nodes that are more ”influential” based on their propagation
effects within the given social networking community.
However the presence of an adversary such as Starhub SH , another telecommunication
service provider in Singapore, wish to launch a similar service in an attempt to capture the same
community of users by containing the spread of Singapore Telecom’s influencer marketing
campaign. Such dynamics and interplay between two competing players presented here cannot
be modeled using conventional models. The conventional influence cascading models dictate
that each node u within the network should be in one of the following two possible states: 1)
active (adopted the service by ST ), and 2) inactive (has not adopted the service by ST ). With
the presence of an adversary like SH to our problem where he is not only trying to dissuade
u to adopt the service by ST but actively attempt to persuade u to adopt a competing service
by SH . Thus each u in the social networking community can be in one of the following three
states: 1) active (adopted the service by ST ), 2) active (adopted the service by SH) and 3)
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inactive (has not adopted either service by ST or SH). Besides this, the dynamic of cascading
effects is also differ from the conventional models where propagation is allowed to diffuse
through every active nodes, whereas the propagation is only allow to diffuse through activated
node of similar type in our problem with the presence of an adversary.
Our findings can be applied in decision problems that require game theoretic modeling to
mimic strategic interaction, especially in business marketing and economic studies where an
adversary is presence. One specific example is the game of market penetration decision. A new
player (Entrance) needs to decide whether to compete against a stronger adversary, the Incum-
bent in a new market. If the Entrance decides to do so, what strategy should be deployed to
secure the largest pool of loyal consumers with strong resiliency against Incumbent’s strategy.
It is more economic viable to maximize the overall market adoption or simply to fortify a niche
pool of loyal consumers?
1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions
We are interested to mine the duopoly consumer market using a sequential game model with
network influence, for ascertaining an efficient node selection policy in securing the largest
pool of loyal customer base given a customer network. We illustrated the viability of using
the value based approach for achieving such objective by deploying the alpha-beta pruning
heuristic in Minimax approach to evaluate the game states. Our work offers a broader view on
the dynamics of competition between two players and how a collective behavior will emerge
from changes in individual characteristics in an influence network under bounded rationality.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Network influence are observable dispersion effects which normally originated from a small
local group to larger interconnected structure through various means of diffusion. A phenom-
ena which resulted from network behavioral interaction. Researchers in business and engi-
neering schools studied the effects of network influence in a variety of domains such as riot
control policies in social science context, the decision making process of politicians to reach a
common consensus in politics, the outbreak of contagious disease in science, the interactions
among yeast protein in biomedical, and viral marketing through online media system in busi-
ness economics. The field of research can be broadly classified into two categories namely as
the influence propagation models, and the algorithms to estimate the propagation effects.
The classical Influence Maximization Problem which necessitates an influence propagation
model and means to estimate the propagation effects is used as one of the basis for our work.
A formal description to express the Influence Maximization Problem as an optimization prob-
lem is provided by [12] as follow. A graph G=(V,E) represents a network of interest with
E as the set of all binary connections between two vertices in set V. TheS ⊆ V defines the
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subset of vertices selected for initiating the diffusion process. The objective is to maximize
total influenced vertices. The propagation models considered by the researchers were Linear
Threshold and Independent Cascade, and the complexity of problem was proven to be NP-hard
through reduction from the Vertex Cover and the Hitting Set Problems. The solution quality
is also guaranteed to be an (1 - 1/e - ) approximate to the optimal solution by exploiting the
sub-modularity property inherited in this problem, illustrated through a greedy algorithm which
adds node with maximum marginal gain into the seed set. We will cover the literature of former
category in greater details in the section below.
On the other hand, research on strategic competitions are typically grounded on sequential
search models. Sequential search is an approach used for investigating the dynamics of decision
making logics through specified conditions of social interaction (e.g. player characteristics,
search rules, informational assumptions and payoffs). Each player is assumed to have their
own beliefs and utility function over the outcomes. The players’ choices are to maximize (or
minimize) their respective expected utility value.
Our problem departs from all earlier models in the following manner: our model allows
a consumer to renew their product choice at different stages based on the payoff function,
instead of progressive manner where the consumers are unable to change their product choice
subsequently. We allow both players to instigate any eligible consumer to change his product
choice at each stage in a sequential manner (which is different from the classical single-agent
influence maximization problem). Thirdly a contractual lock-in policy is introduced to deter
recent targeted consumer from defecting.
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2.1 Influence Propagation Models
Given a social network with estimates of individuals’ influence rating, Domingos and Richard-
son [4, 17] explored a fundamental Set Selection problem with influence propagation effect.
The social network is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), G where nodes represent
consumers and the edges represent influence relationship. For a binary model, the node is active
when it adopts a product or service and inactive otherwise. The tendency for a node to convert
from inactive to active state is governed by one of the many diffusion models described later
in this chapter. For these diffusion models, the node conversion process occurs in a progressive
manner where an inactive node may convert to become active but not otherwise. Heuristics
are normally employed to identify the k-cardinal of consumers to target when the propagation
effects are probabilistic. This class of problems is known as single agent Influence Maximiza-
tion Problem. More formally, the objective is to target a set of A such that the expected size of
converted consumers, σ(A) := E[|ϕ(A)|] is maximized [13]. The efficiency in achieving this is
largely depends on the performance of the search algorithm used to determine set A over a very
large network, which entails the empirical estimation of propagation effects. Some of the com-
mon estimation approaches are Mix Greedy Independent Cascade approach [3], Cost Effective
Lazy Forward [14], Greedy algorithm [12], Degree Discount heuristic [3], and Stochastic Cel-
lular Automata [7]. Garlick and Chli [6] extended the Influence Maximization Problem to an
agent based simulation model for investigating the lock-in dynamic within consumer networks.
Their proposed influence propagation model is composed of environmental factor, consumers’
follower tendency, and products quality. Their simulation model assumed the agents to be
aware of everyone else product choices in the network.
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2.1.1 Linear Threshold Model
Numerous types of influence propagation models were proposed by researchers to describe var-
ious means of cascading effects under different conditions. Granovetter and Schelling [8] were
among the first to propose models that capture the progressive change of nodes in networks.
The concept of Linear Threshold model proposed by [8] was based on node-specific thresh-
olds. An inactive node v at time t-1 will become active (and remain active) at time t under the
following condition: ∑
u∈N(v)
wv,uXu,t−1 ≥ Threshold(v) (2.1)
The variable Xu,t−1 is 1 if u was active at time t-1 and 0 otherwise. The variable wv,u de-
notes the degree of influence on v by u (the level of which u being active will contribute to
v being active). Intuitively, if a predetermined fraction (threshold) of v is less than the sum
of degree of influence from its active neighbors. This model is also known to be the founda-
tion for a large body of work in the Sociology domain. Subsequently the Granovetter’s Linear
Threshold model is generalized as General Threshold [13] model as it can be deduced into a
re-parameterization form of node v with monotone activation function fv : 2v → [0, 1], and ac-
tivation threshold θv which is chosen independently, uniformly and randomly from the interval
of (0,1]. A node v will become active at time t+1 if and only if fv(S) ≥ θv, where S denotes
the set of active nodes at time t. This model is different from the Linear Threshold model as it
focuses on the cumulative influence of all nodes from a set S instead of the individual attempts
of nodes u ∈ S.
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2.1.2 General Threshold Model
Subsequently the Granovetter’s Linear Threshold model is generalized as General Threshold
[13] model as it can be deduced into a re-parameterization form of node v with monotone
activation function fv : 2v → [0, 1], and activation threshold θv which is chosen independently,
uniformly and randomly from the interval of (0,1]. A node v will become active at time t+1 if
and only if fv(S) ≥ θv, where S denotes the set of active nodes at time t. This model is different
from the Linear Threshold model as it focuses on the cumulative influence of all nodes from a
set S instead of the individual attempts of nodes u ∈ S.
2.1.3 Independent Cascade Model
Given a social network represented as a directed graph G=(V,E). Each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E
has a probability of pe to be activated. The state of each node is either active or inactive.
When node u is activated at time t, it will attempt to activate all currently inactive neigbor v. If
v is activated by u, v will become active at time t + Tuv. The time unit of Tuv are independent
and exponentially distributed continuous random variables. Node v will attempt to activate his
inactive neighbors subsequently and so forth. Therefore the activated node always has the same
type as the first neighbor that succeeded in activating it. [7]
In the context of influence maximization game with b number of players, each player i
selects a set Si of at most ki cardinal of nodes. A node selected by more than one player will
be assigned to one of the players randomly and uniformly. When Si is activated for influence
cascade by i, the process will proceed as described earlier until no new activations occur. If we
let T1, ..., Tb denote the active sets at that point, then the goal of i is to maximize E[|Ti|]. Player
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i is indifferent between strategies Si and S ′i if the expected propagation effects are the same.
2.1.4 Decreasing Cascade Model
The decreasing cascade model is a special case of independent cascade model defined by [13].
Letting the probability of successful activation by a node u in activating v is denote as pv(u).
For the Independent cascade model, this probability is a constant pv(u) independent of the
history of the process. However, v’s propensity for being activated may change as a function
of its neighbors’s attempts (and failed) in influencing it. If we let S denotes the set of v’s
neighbors that have attempted to influence v, then the success probability for u can be denoted
as pv(u, S). In the decreasing cascade model, the function of pv(u, S) is non-increasing in S
(i.e. pv(u, S) ≥ pv(u, T ) whenever S ⊆ T . So this addition restriction limit the a contagious
node’s probability to activate v.
2.1.5 Utility Function Model
Most relevant to our problem context was the Utility Function based propagation model com-
monly used to evaluate consumer product selection. Janssen and Jager [10] proposed this model
which incorporated cognitive behavioral theories, to study the consumer purchasing decision
from a psychological perspective. The authors concluded that the behavioral processes which
drive the consumers decision are mainly based upon their needs such as low prices, high social
comparison, and type of cognitive processing that the consumers utilize. [6] generalized the
notion to formulate an utility model to represent the consumer personal pleasure in consuming
a product. The value in the utility model is derived based on the consumer’s perception of a
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product quality, and their tendency to follow the trends within a localized community. Here the
decision making process of consumers is assumed to be adversarial and responsive to network
externalities, so a product with the highest utility value will be selected. A general utility model
proposed by [6] is,
Ui = (1− ft)(Qi −Qdes) + ft(Ni/Np). (2.2)
Ui denotes the amount of pleasure a consumer derives from product i. The follower tendency
of a consumer, ft has a value in the range of [0,1]. Qi is the consumer’s experienced quality of
product i and has a range value of [0,1]. Here the consumers are assumed to have a minimum
quality requirement, Qdes of 0.5 to be satisfied. The number of consumers who select product
i and the total number of consumers are denoted as Ni and Np respectively.
Numerous variation of propagation models were proposed to represent specific cascading
effects for agricultural, citations, on-line community and social media, biological networks and
human interactions. However the linear threshold, independent cascade and decreasing cascade
model do not have any mechanism to account for the impact of the presence of adversaries in
their cascading models. Therefore the strategies obtained based on the effects and outcomes of
propagation with active adversaries will be significantly different from the conventional study.
Nonetheless, the literature review presented above are relevant to our specific problem to certain
extends and provided an overview of the landscape in influence propagation/ cascading research
field.
14
2.2 Sequential Search Algorithm
Research on strategic competitions are typically grounded on a form of sequential search which
deal with analytical analysis of strategic play between two or more decision makers typically
known as players. Sequential search models entail the anticipation of adversary’s next action
whilst analyze the next counter-measure which returns the ”best” possible expected payoffs.
The expected payoff for a player is not only determine by his choice of play, but conjointly with
adversary’ choice of play. A player’s decision is typically governed by an objective function
which he tries to maximize (or minimize). Suppose we consider a simple competition between
two players where both do not know of each other’s payoff function. Then the first player,
p1 strategy choice will depend on what he perceives to be his opponent’s, p2 payoff function
U2, as the nature of the latter will be an important determinant of p2 action in the game. If
we let the expectation about U2 to be called p1’s first order expectation, then p1’s strategy
choice will also depend on what he expects to be p2’s first order expectation about his own
(p1’s) payoff function, U1. So this is termed as p1’s second order expectation because it is
an expectation concerning the first order expectation. So p1’s strategy choice will depend
on what he expects to be p2’s second order expectation (what p1 thinks that p2 thinks that p1
thinks about p2’s payoff function U2. So this can be termed as p1’s third order expectation and
so on infinitely [9]. In short, it is a logic game for designing tactic to achieve best results, given
the adversary’s possible approach.
The players in sequential search are typically assumed to behave in a rational manner. A
rational player is defined as an individual with consistent preferences if his beliefs and the
information of the current state are consistent as well. Researchers use the analogy of a tree
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to reason decisions made by players. First the search space is defined as a tree where each of
the tree nodes corresponds to a decision choice by the player’s and the branches at each node
denote all possible choices at that decision epoch. The tree root represents the first move from
the current state and the tree leaves represent all possible final outcomes at specified ply depth.
The expected payoff for each strategy is calculated based on the trace from root to each leave in
the tree. As the construction of the decision tree involves the dimension of time, it is essential
to consider the player sequence, the given known information, and payoff function for each
leave in the decision tree.
2.2.1 Minimax Search
The crucial component in most sequential search analysis is the efficiency of search algorithm.
A human player will try to find the ”best” move to make by ”looking ahead” a few moves,
predicting the response of his opponent to each of his own possible moves (and the responses
to these responses, and so on) and select the move that seems most promising. In short, the
entire search space which comprises of all the possible moves by the player is evaluated to
determine a strategy with the ”best” outcome. Assuming that both players choose the strategy
with the highest possibility of winning for them, the payoff of the best strategy is returned to
the current search state. Player 1 p1 tries to maximize the chance of winning the competition,
whilst Player 2 p2 tries to maximize his own chance, which is equivalent to minimizing p1’s
chance. Therefore the process of backing up the value of the best move for alternating sides is
called minimaxing, and hence the two-player sequential search algorithm is said to perform a
minimax search.
Minimax search is based on a depth-first algorithm and increasing the search depth generally
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will improve the quality of the decision. Hence the researchers are focused on improving
the efficiency of search, such that they could effectively search a higher number of ply depth
within a realistic time constraint. One of such enhancement to the basic Minimax search is
alpha-beta pruning heuristic to be described further in Section 2.2.2. For now we will look at
a conventional minimax search using tic-tac-toe game as an example. Given the game is in
current state, all the possible moves from the current state is depicted in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Mov s for Current Tic-Tac-Toe State
If we denote player X as ”Max” and player O as ”Min”, the entire search space can be
represented using a graph as shown in Figure 2.2 where Max player’s moves are shown as
square, and Min player’s moves are shown as circle. The possible moves from each decision
state are represented by a link in the graph. The root node represents the current state. In this
example, the Max player has three possible moves from the current state which lead to nodes b,
c and g. By accounting for the options of Min player in each of these nodes, and the responses
by Max player, the entire search space can be constructed as in Figure 2.2.
Nodes a, c, e, g and i are called interior nodes. Nodes b, d, f , h and j are the leaf nodes
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in the tree. Considering all the possible strategies to find the best one is usually referred to as
searching the tree. A move by a player is often known as a half-move or a ply. The leaf
nodes of the tree indicate the end of decision choice, and the value of minimax function f can
be determined. A win for Max player is denoted as +1 here, whereas a -1 denotes a loss. The
value of 0 denotes a draw. The root of the tree is at level 0. Player Max will make a move to
maximize the outcome f at all even levels, whilst player Min will do similarly to minimize the
outcome f at all odd levels. Thus the f equals the maximum values of its children at all even
levels, and f equals the minimum values at all odd levels likewise. The f is recursively defined
at all states. By searching for the minimax value, the best strategy can be found.
The minimax search is practical for tic-tac-toe example where the tree is sufficiently small
enough to traverse all the possible strategy till the evaluation ends within a reasonable amount
of time. Further more the evaluation function is simple and the final outcome is either win,
loss or draw. For most practical scenarios, this approach is infeasible because the entire search
space is too big. For these complex scenarios (e.g. chess, checkers and othello), the evaluation
function is changed to return a heuristic assessment, which allow a payoff value to be returned
from any state in the analysis, instead of where the evaluation has ended. From the perspective
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of search algorithm, the change can be considered as minor. The evaluation function is modified
by a different definition of a leaf node (terminal node). The search of minimax tree is stopped at
a fixed ply depth from the root and the expected payoff at that state is evaluated. This heuristic
approach is known as Alpha-Beta pruning.
2.2.2 Minimax with Alpha-Beta Pruning
The Alpha-Beta heuristic enhances the minimax search with pruning. Pruning can yield sizable
performance improvement by reducing the number of strategies need to be evaluated, and thus
reduce the complexity of search to the square root. The researchers that first describe a form
of pruning are [15] and the corresponding pseudo-code is depicted in Figure 2.3. It consists
of the minimax function with two additional input parameters and pruning tests. The α and β
parameters are known as the search bound. At max nodes, the payoff value is returned as the
lower bound to children nodes as the α parameter. Whenever any of the children nodes finds
that it can no longer return a payoff value above that lower bound, further search is deem to
be unnecessary and therefore pruned. At the min nodes, the payoff value returned as the upper
bound β parameter. The β parameter is passed on o that any max children nodes with a lower
bound ≥ β can be pruned as required. Together the α and β form a search bound which can be
regarded as the range for a node to return a payoff which lies within this bound. Whenever a
node finds that its payoff value is proven to be outside of this bound, the search is terminated.
As more nodes are expanded, the bounds become tighter till the min and max payoff value of
equal to the minimax value of the root.
Our problem departs from all earlier models in the following manner: our model allows a
consumer to renew their product choice at different stages based on a payoff function, instead
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2.1 Minimax Trees and Alpha-Beta 17
function alphabeta(n! _ ! `) A g;
if n = leaf then return eval(n);
else if n = max then
g := ';
c := firstchild(n);
while g < ` and c = do
g := max g! alphabeta(c!_ ! `) ;
_ := max(_ ! g);
c := nextbrother(c);
else /* n is a min node */
g := +';
c := firstchild(n);
while g > _ and c = do
g := min g! alphabeta(c! _ ! `) ;
` := min(` ! g);
c := nextbrother(c);
return g;
Figure 2.7: The Alpha-Beta Function
12 a
b 12
c
41
d
12
`=+'
_=12 e ) 10
"
10
g
Figure 2.8: Node g is Cut Off
Figure 2.3: Pseudo-code for Alpha-Beta Pruning Heuristic
of progressive manner where the consumer is unable to change their product subsequently.
Both players are allow to instigate any eligible consumer at each stage in sequential manner
to optimize the respective player’s market share which is differ from the single-agent influ-
ence maximization problem. Thirdly a contractual lock-in policy is introduced to deter recent
targeted consumer from defecting.
20
Chapter 3
Methodology Design and Implementation
3.1 Influence Propagation with Investment
According to studies in school of behavior sciences, consumer’s decision is affected by both
intrinsic factors and extrinsic factors irregardless whether it’s a minor or major purchase. For
simplicity purpose and without lost of generality, we let the intrinsic factor to comprise of
market player’s incentive which will alter a consumer’s decision choice. Similarly we let the
extrinsic factors to cover peers’ influence. Here the consumers are assumed to respond pos-
itively towards marketing campaign by selecting product which provides higher normalized
utility value synonymous to consumer satisfaction level. The proposed normalized utility value
is an extension of [6] model, where we incorporated a persuasive incentive, Inv, which can be
a form of monetary reward. The effects of influence is assumed to propagate instantaneously.
We assume that there are two players competing for their respective market shares in a
social network modeled as an acyclic directed graph. The nodes in the directed graph represent
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individuals and links represent relationships among individuals (since the graph is directed,
the impacts are directional). The two players are to take turns making decisions with infinite
decision horizon. At each decision epoch, the player will be endowed a fixed player-specific
budget and could spend this budget on one of the nodes. As stated earlier, unspent budget
cannot be carried over.
To focus on the network effect, we assume that for each node (customer), her decision
depends solely on two factors: 1) the influence from her neighbors, and 2) the direct investment
from any player. Expressed formally, customer n’s utility value for the product owned by player
i in time period t is:
uti(n) =
∑
m:am,n=1
I{ct−1(m)=i}
|{m′ : am′,n = 1}| +M
t
i (n), (3.1)
where ct−1(m) represents the choice of nodem in time period t−1, am,n denotes the linkage
from m to n (1 if such link exists, 0 otherwise), and this term evaluates the network influence
effects (influence from all neighbors which link to him) on node n. M ti (n) represents the
investment by player i on node n in time period t. With the above utility function definition,
node n’s choice in time period t is then simply:
ct(n) =

argmaxi u
t
i(n), T
t(n) ≥ τ ;
ct−1(n), otherwise.
(3.2)
Note that in (3.2), customer n is only allowed to change her decision if she has maintained a
particular choice for more than τ time periods (T t(n) is the number of time periods customer n
has maintained its current choice). This particular feature is to emulate the minimum length of
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contract one has to sign on when a new product is chosen. This design also helps to eliminate
simple cycles among players (players keep selecting the most crucial node).
When a new investment is made, or the time period has progressed (thus changing the value
of T t(n)), some nodes might end up with new product choices, and these changes will create
ripple effects that need to be properly accounted for. Considering the potential interactions
among connected nodes, we have to propagate these updates using proper order. The procedure
is described as follows:
1. Let S be the set containing all nodes.
2. Let R ≡ {n|n ∈ S, am,n = 0, ∀m ∈ S} (in other words, R is the set of root nodes in
S). Let S ← S \ R.
3. For n ∈ R, compute uti(n) for i = 1 and 2 following (3.1). ct(n) can then be found from
(3.2).
4. If S = ∅, stop, otherwise, go to step 2.
The above procedure always terminates if the graph is acyclic.
3.2 Node Selection Policies
Wih the above influence propagation model, players are allowed to take turns making decisions
on which node to invest in. Given the complexity of the influence propagation model described
in 3.1, even with perfect information on {ct(n)} and {T t(n)}, a player has to rely on pure
enumeration to find the best node to invest in. Note that the above problem is only with one
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time period and without considering any adversary. Although it might be possible to formulate
player’s decision making problem with infinite horizon and adversary, it will be computation-
ally intractable. As such, when we design player’s strategy, we explicitly define number of
future time periods to be included in the evaluation, and treat that as a strategy parameter (we
call it the look-ahead time periods).
Although we can make single-player’s strategy tractable by setting a small-enough look-
ahead time periods, such limitation would create some unexpected issue in how we evaluate
the importance of each node. In most influence maximization problems, the importance of a
node can be characterized by the number of converts it can bring in through influence propaga-
tion. When adversaries are present and horizon is infinite, we can still estimate the importance
of a node by using average or discounted measure (commonly used techniques in infinite hori-
zon decision making problems) and having appropriate opponent model. Unfortunately, if we
artificially limit the number of periods that we look ahead, these classical approach will not
work anymore. To see this, assume the look-ahead period is just 1, implying that this player
would be myopic. In this case, the strategy is essentially an influence maximizer that simply
chooses the node that would result in maximum immediate gain; however, as one would expect,
given that there is an adversary, such gain might be short-lived, and the choice might turn out
to be a short-term gain, long-term loss.
One way to deal with such undesirable side effect of limiting planning horizon is to properly
define a value function that would approximate a node’s true value suppose we are able to
reason with infinite horizon. In our initial study, we defined one such estimation function, and
to distinguish it from the conventional ways of estimating a node’s value, we call the strategy
that relies on conventional measure the count-based approach, and the strategy that relies on
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the value function as the value-based approach which is define formally in the next subsection.
3.2.1 Count Based Approach
In this thesis, the conventional way of estimating a node’s value is deem to be myopic and only
aims to maximize the immediate market share. As an example, suppose there are two or more
nodes that potentially be targeted by the player. The player can evaluate the importance of each
of these nodes by counting the number of converts resulted from the influence propagation after
each decision epoch by both players. The node with the highest expected number of converts
will be selected for conversion. As such the approach is resemble to the greedy approach where
the node with the largest marginal gain in number of adopters will be selected. This approach
does not strategize any plan to fortify nodes from changing their product choice under the
network influence effects. As such it is called the count-based approach.
Formally speaking, the count-based approach is the strategy where player i use the following
function to evaluate the total value for all nodes under his control in time period t:
vti =
∑
n
I{ct(n)=i}. (3.3)
With (3.3), the importance value of a particular node m not owned by i is simply
vti(c
t(m) set to 1)− vti .
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3.2.2 Value Based Approach
Although the value-based approach can take many different forms, a simple function that fo-
cuses on the quantity of nodes under the player’s control as well as the strength of the control
is adopted here. The individual node’s value is still computed in a similar fashion as the count
based case, but the strength of control is quantified by summing up the utilities for nodes that
are controlled by the player i in time t:
vti =
∑
n:ct(n)=i
uti(n)
2. (3.4)
The intuition behind the derivation of this function is originated from the first term in (3.1)
which evaluates the network influence effects. Suppose there exist two nodes, n and m with
same marginal gain in number of adopters if either one is targeted, and both n and m have
more than a neighbor (surrounding node with influence link) connected to them. The node with
higher proportion of neighbors that adopt the same product choice as himself will be selected
because the strength of control under this case will be higher based on equation (3.4). Therefore
we conjecture that the value-based approach will exhibit a ”fortifying” effect on selected nodes
under infinite horizon. When this occurs, we conjecture the number of adopters for player that
deploys this approach to increase as well.
3.3 Implementation
To account for the adversary who is effectively competing for the market share in a zero-sum
fashion, we introduce a minimax procedure to enable players to reason strategically. Given
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a state tuple ({ct(n)}, {T t(n)}), the current player (the maximizing player) will explore all
feasible choices, and for each choice, compute the objective value vti by using either Equation
(3.3) or (3.4) from the state space at number of look-ahead moves. Now it’s adversary’s turn to
make choice, the assumption is that he will make choice that minimizes the maximizing player’s
objective value. In general both players are maximizing their own payoff value calculated
according to their objective function at their number of look-ahead moves. The number of
look-ahead moves allowed will be a player-specific parameter in our model. This process
will continue until we reach one of the termination criteria. A complete state space for our
problem cannot be illustrated as the tic-tac-toe example shown in Figure 2.2 due to the size
of the problem. An illustration of the possible Minimax search state space for our problem
is presented in Figure 3.1. The square and round nodes represent the decision points of two
different players, and the number within each node denotes the player’s choice.
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Figure 3.1: An Illustration of the Minimax Search State Space for Our Problem.
To improve the performance of the above minimax search procedure, we apply a standard
α-β pruning on the search tree. The α and β values refer to the lower bound for the maximizing
player and the upper bound for the minimizing player. All nodes in the search tree that have
values lower than α (for the maximizing player) or higher than β (for the minimizing player)
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will be pruned. The pseudo-code for Minimax with Alpha -Beta pruning heuristic is presented
in Section 2.2.2.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis
4.1 Experiment Setting
Social influence networks are commonly modeled using a class of graph structures known as
the scale-free networks, which exhibit high clustering coefficient, small mean shortest path
length properties and power-law degree distribution. Scale-free networks exhibit higher frac-
tion of nodes with large (larger than average) number of in-degree edges connected to them
in a network. So networks of any topology that comply to the three properties above can be
classified as scale-free model (also known as power-law degree distribution networks). Kempe
et. al. [11] used the Kleinberg’s Small World network structure as the basis to study gossip
protocols for spreading information in a communication network. In our experiments, we em-
ployed the JGraphT Java graph library which contains mathematical graph theory objects and
algorithm for generating the synthetic scale-free networks. These networks contain 100 nodes
which are a reasonable size for representing influential social network with strong ties. Accord-
ing to Adam et. el., procurement decision of a consumer is influenced mainly by her neighbors
29
Table 4.1: Experimental Design for Scale Free Network Analysis
Factor Values Level
Incumbent Entrant
Node Count Count , Value 2
selection policy based based based
Budget ratio 1 1
3
, 1
2
2
Initial state Null, Random lock-in 2
Play sequence First, Second 2
Instances 1, 2, 3, ... 17 17
with strong ties, compares to all others [1].
Given the size of our experimental networks, minimax algorithm is employed to evaluate
the decision game tree. α-β pruning heuristic is incorporated in the minimax algorithm to
reduce the size of state space by pruning decision branches that prove to be less promising.
The computation effort for α-β approach is upper bounded by the brute force approach in a
complete tree search for each game stage. Our adversarial search problem is emulated using a
simulation model written in Java. When the size of influence network is scaled up, the dynamics
of our problem will result in an exponential growth in number of state space. However when
such situation occurs, the sampling-based approaches can be used to improve the computational
efficiency by sacrificing the comprehensiveness of search.
The following design is used to address our conjecture in this research. A total of 272 ex-
perimental runs are evaluated using 17 sets of distinct instances of scale free network structure
to determine if the proposed value-based node selection policy is able to, 1) identify and 2)
secure a larger pool of customers via the niche-seeking behavior, as oppose to the conventional
count-based (greedy) approach against an adversary who employed the count-based approach.
The nature of our research revolves around two players game where each tries to minimize
their maximum lost in the number of adopters. The consumers in the influence networks are
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initialized under two conditions for the experiments. When the market players enter a new
market space untainted by competition, there is ample amount of opportunity for growth given
that all the consumers are yet to be explored. This is synonymous to a market of consumers
without any obligation (contractual lock-in) and every consumer can be targeted by the players.
Here we denote this initial condition as null state. On the contrary, if the market boundaries are
well defined with players’ competitive rules. The consumers are normally committed to some
form of existing obligations (with various remaining time length) and thus are unavailable to
be targeted the market players. This correspond to the metaphor of red ocean used commonly
to describe a market condition (denoted as random state).
For simplicity purpose, the budget for stronger player is set to 1, and the weaker player is
assigned either 1
3
or 1
2
in this thesis. Since the customer’s utility function is determined by the
ratio of her incoming neighbors owning that product, a budget of 1 implies the stronger player
can convert any customer, while the weaker player can only convert a much smaller fraction
of customers. We use Figure 4.1 as an example to illustrate the concept. Here the minimum
budget required for the player (black) to instigate consumer A is 1
3
.
1"
A
Figure 4.1: Definition of Normalized Marketing Budget
In the following set of experiment, we assumed the incumbent to always adopt the myopic
count based approach and the entrant will adopt both node selection policies for compari-
son purpose. To remove the first-mover’s advantage (any advantage from knowing the other
player’s move before making her own choice), each player will get to play first for each net-
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work instance.
4.2 Results and Discussions
The effectiveness of our proposed value based node selection approach is investigated using
the synthetic influence networks generated as described earlier. The experimental results pre-
sented in the following are based on the performance of entrant player. The performance of
the incumbent is not presented because the node selection approach adopted by the incumbent
player remain the same across all experimental runs.
Given the budget limitation constraint on the entrant player, we foresee her market share to
be lower than the adversary. However we conjectured that the entrant player could garner a
larger market share simply by changing her node selection policy to consider long-term node
values. Using the synthetic consumer influence networks data, we attested the effectiveness
of the proposed value-based node selection policy. Without going into details, we would like
to illustrate visually the niche-seeking behavior by our value-based strategy. As illustrated
in Figure 4.2, a sub-group is quickly identified and captured by the entrant player, and such
behavior is consistently observed in the steady state and also for other network instances. For
the rest of the section, we will define the steady state and quantitative measures that allow us to
quantify the niche-seeking behaviors.
4.2.1 Identifying Set of Steady States
Recall that our model is with infinite horizon, thus the adoption status might change radically
from epoch to epoch. Therefore, unless this dynamic adoption process comes to a complete stop
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Figure 4.2: The Effects of Value-Based Approach.
(e.g., one player completely dominates the market), it would be unfair to take any snapshot and
conclude the performances of player’s strategies.
If complete stop is not observe in a particular experiment instance, what we can do instead
is to identify the repeating states. According to Section 3.1, the state at time t can be described
by two vectors: {ct(n)} and {T t(n)}. For the purpose of performance evaluation, we only
need {ct(n)}. Based on the above description, at least one state will eventually appear for the
second time, since the set of feasible values of ct(n) is finite and t is unbounded. Suppose the
state in time t is denoted as St and St = S ′, if S ′ is observed again in time t+ δ, the experiment
can be terminated early and the set {St, St+1, . . . , St+δ−1} will contain all the repeating states
of this experiment instance. We can make this claim because all strategies we proposed are
deterministic and not dependent on {T t(n)}.
This is an important observation, as we can now use the set of repeating states to quantify
player’s performances. When we report the experiment results, we focus on two measures:
the average and the niche performance metric over the set of repeating states. The analysis of
experiment results is presented in the next subsections.
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Figure 4.3: Repeating States
4.2.2 Average and Volatility in Number of Adopters
The study of diffusion models typically refer to a successful propagation of an idea or inno-
vation to an individual node within a social network G as active, whereas an unsuccessful
propagation as inactive. Similarly here but with a slight change, the node which adopts either
the entrant or incumbent product choice is denoted as adopter. Whereas the node which adopts
neither players’ product choice is denoted as null. The number of adopter for each player will
be determined at every game stage in each experimental run. For example, the expected number
of adopter for entrant player is calculated by taking the mean value of entrant player’s adopter
throughout the steady state for all experimental runs. The effects of play sequence is blocked
by computing the mean value of number of adopter from both play sequences by the same
player. In this way, any effect from the first mover advantage can be blocked and thus isolated.
Besides examining averages, we also compute the volatility of market shares from state to
state (in the same repeating set); such measure allows us to judge the stability and robustness
of a particular player’s strategy as well. The computation of volatility is inspired by and bor-
rowed from the financial literature. To illustrate how it’s computed, let {m1,m2, . . . ,mδ} be
the sequence of market shares for a particular player over the set of steady states. We can first
compute the log market share relatives as: ri = ln(mi+1/mi). The volatility can then be com-
puted by computing the standard deviation of all ri’s. The above two performance measures
under different experiment settings (combination of null and random initialization and budget
ratio of 1
3
and 1
2
with blocked play sequence) are presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Summary of experiment results when opponent adopts CB approach (CB and VB
stand for count- and value-based respectively).
# of Adopters (std. dev.) Volatity
CB (Volatity against CB)
nu
ll
1
3
CB 45.2 (0.015) 0.0625
VB 67.8 (0.031) 0.0335
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
1
2
CB 46.3 (0.018) 0.0761
VB 69.1 (0.027) 0.0337
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p <0.001
ra
nd
om
1
3
CB 30.8 (0.027) 0.0170
VB 40.9 (0.019) 0.0232
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
1
2
CB 32.0 (0.021) 0.0130
VB 44.4 (0.030) 0.0191
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
A two sample t-test is applied to evaluate the statistical difference between the two node
selection policies. The null hypothesis, H0 denotes the means (in number of adopters) of both
policies is equal; whereas we let the alternate hypothesis, H1 to denote the means of value-
based is greater than the count-based. For convenient purposes, we let the significance level
(also known as the alpha level), α = 0.05 arbitrary. The results indicate that it is always better
for the entrant player to adopt the value-based node selection policy. By simply adopting
the value-based strategy (which considers a node’s long-term value), the entrant player can
perform considerably better than the myopic count-based strategy by approximately 50% in
average number of adopters for all cases (e.g. initial market conditions and budget levels).
Both node selection policies are also observe to be insensitive to budget as both strategies
record almost similar number of adopters in the experiments. The average number of adopters
increases merely by one when the budget is increase from 1
3
to 1
2
of the adversary’s.
Figure 4.4 depicts the performance in average number of adopters under different initial con-
dition for both strategies when the entrant’s budget is 1
3
of the incumbent’s. The market share of
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the entrant player gains approximately 10% (for initial null condition) and approximately 20%
(for initial random lock-in condition) respectively, when the node selection policy is changed
from count based strategy to value based strategy. Similar comparison at a higher budget level
of 1
2
is illustrate in Figure 4.5. The average number of adopters for entrant player increases ap-
proximately 12% and 25% for initial null and random lock-in condition respectively, when the
node selection policy is changed from count based to value based strategy. These observations
are intuitive because the dispersion of influence within a network of null state is less restric-
tive (where all the nodes are available to be targeted), and thus allows the influence effects to
be cascaded to a larger number of nodes. Therefore the number of adopters is expected to be
higher than random initial lock-in condition.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of Adopter For Entrant Product Choice At A Third of Incumbent’s
Budget Levels With Both Initial Game States
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of Adopter For Entrant Product Choice At Half of Incumbent’s Budget
Levels With Both Initial Game States
Although the budget level will affect the size of potential target customers, the value-based
strategy is able to estimate the true long term value of each customer more accurately and
subsequently translate this finding into an observable result in number of adopters. Therefore
the node selection policy is more important factor than budget level for improving the market
share.
In summary, the experimental results strongly support our conjecture that to succeed in a
competitive influence maximization game with infinite horizon, it’s very important to evaluate
a node’s long-term value correctly. Although our value function is extremely simple, it’s still
significantly better than the conventional approach that just myopically maximize immediate
market gains. In terms of volatility, we can see that against a count-based adversary in a null
initialization, the entrant will enter a much stable steady state if he chooses the value-based
approach. However, such difference diminishes when the initialization becomes random.
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4.2.3 Niche Performance Metric
In the previous subsection, we show that value-based strategy performs better than the count-
based approach under all circumstances for the entrant player. To find out whether such value-
based strategy would result in players building niche customer base, we define a niche perfor-
mance metric to measure the degree of niche seeking. This metric calculates the proportion of
edges where both the source and target nodes adopt the same product type over total number
of edges. When the source and target nodes are adopting the same product type, it implies an
influence propagation effect from the source to target node. On the contrarily, when the source
and target node’s product type is different from each other, it symbolizes a non-continuity in
influence spread.
The comparison on niche performance metric for both initializations is summarized in Ta-
ble 4.3. It is observed that regardless of setups, the value-based approach always ends up with
higher niche performance metric in steady states. The These experiment results confirm our
second conjecture: it’s indeed more advantageous for weaker player to concentrate on smaller
niche in the scale-free networks. However the increments in niche performance metric when
the budget is increased are statistically insignificant.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Suppose that we have just completed an analysis which will have a major impact on the com-
pany’s marketing strategy and about to present such results to the management committees. It
is important to know if our analysis will remain valid when the basic data and assumptions are
slightly inaccurate. The questions normally one could ask are, what impact will those differ-
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Table 4.3: Summary of Niche Performance Metric When Opponent Adopts CB Approach (CB
and VB Stand for Count- and Value-Based Respectively).
Average value (std. dev.)
nu
ll
1
3
CB 0.425 (0.019)
VB 0.711 (0.033)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001
1
2
CB 0.443 (0.024)
VB 0.718 (0.038)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001
ra
nd
om
1
3
CB 0.247 (0.038)
VB 0.365 (0.054)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001
1
2
CB 0.262 (0.023)
VB 0.388 (0.046)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001
ences have on our conclusions? Will the findings be completely different, or just only minor
impact? Thus it is crucial to conduct some level of sensitivity analysis to examine the impact
of the assumptions or parameter values used in the experiment.
In the following sensitivity analysis, our interest is to address the question of whether the
value-based node selection policy is still a better strategy for the entrant player, if her oppo-
nent adopts the value-based approach. How the two primary performance measures (average
number of adopters and niche performance metric) will response when the assumption on in-
cumbent’s strategy is relaxed. To answer these questions, the same series of experiments as in
Table 4.1 are performed with the incumbent adopts the value-based.
4.3.1 Average Number of Active Nodes
Table 4.4 highlights the impact of two different node selection policies adopt by the incumbent
player (by table row) and whether the earlier observations still valid (by table column). The
results indicate a reduction in average number of adopters across all experimental settings when
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the incumbent’s strategy is changed to value-based. This observation is intuitive as the incum-
bent player is leveraging on the advantages of higher budget level and value-based strategy to
capture the market share. Thus the entrant player has no additional competitive advantage over
her opponent when both adopt the value-based node selection policy. The effect of increment in
budget level is also statistically insignificance regardless of incumbent’s node selection policy.
Nevertheless the entrant player will still perform better with the value-based strategy always
(as indicate by the p-value obtain from the t-test).
Table 4.4: Summary of Comparison Results of Both Node Selection Policies by Incumbent
Player (CB and VB Stand for Count- and Value-Based Respectively).
# of Adopters (std. dev.)
Adversary Strategy
CB VB
nu
ll
1
3
CB 45.2 (0.015) 24.3 (0.036)
VB 67.8 (0.031) 45.1 (0.023)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
1
2
CB 46.3 (0.018) 25.5 (0.039)
VB 69.1 (0.027) 45.7 (0.021)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
ra
nd
om
1
3
CB 30.8 (0.027) 17.8 (0.028)
VB 40.9 (0.019) 28.0 (0.031)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
1
2
CB 32.0 (0.021) 23.1 (0.023)
VB 44.4 (0.030) 30.8 (0.037)
Sig. diff. (p-value) p<0.001 p<0.001
Figure 4.6 illustrates the effects of both node selection policies at specific budget level across
the two initializations. The benefit of value-based strategy is more prominent when the initial
market condition is in null state as depict by a larger increase in number of adopters. The ran-
dom contractual lock-in initial state allows the formation of sub-structures/ sub-groups within
the influence network. This in turn constricts the dispersion of influence and subsequently the
effects of value-based strategy. Similar outcomes are observed (Figure 4.7) when the entrant
player budget is increased to 1
2
of the incumbent’s
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of Adopter For Entrant Product Choice At 1
3
of Incumbent’s Budget
Levels With Both Initial Game States
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Figure 4.7: Percentage of Adopter For Entrant Product Choice At 1
2
of Incumbent’s Budget
Levels With Both Initial Game States
4.3.2 Niche Performance Metric
The results in term of niche performance metric indicate likewise that the proposed value-based
strategy is able to construct a stronger niche customer base than the count-based strategy under
null initial state (Figure 4.8), as well as under random initial state (Figure 4.9). Now It is
possible to conclude that the value-based strategy is more niche − seeking than then myopic
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and greedy count-based strategy.
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Figure 4.8: Niche Performance of Count Based Versus Value Based Approach under Null Initial
Constraint at Two Budget Levels Given Incumbent With Value-based Approach
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Figure 4.9: Niche Performance of Count Based Versus Value Based Approach under Random
Initial Lock-In Constraint at Two Budget Levels Given Incumbent With Value-based Approach
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Product marketing has been very competitive in this era where information (user comments or
friends recommendation) propagated almost instantaneously through the interconnected con-
sumers network. Given that consumers purchasing behavior are increasingly influence by their
social networks to maximize the consumers’ value in product consumption. We constructed
a simple two-player, infinite horizon extension of the influence maximization model to illus-
trate the importance of considering both adversary and time in this thesis. Although influence
maximization is a well-studied problem in the literature, it resurfaces to capture researchers’
attention recently due to the fact that societal-scale social networks are increasingly ubiquitous.
However, the classical research on influence maximization lacks either the explicit modeling of
adversaries or the consideration of time.
In this thesis, the count-based approach which represents the conventional influence max-
imization approach is shown to perform much worse than the value-based approach which
approximates the long-term values of individual nodes. Furthermore, we show the value-based
approach to achieve a better performance via niche-seeking, which is measured using our niche
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performance metric. Our model also provides a simple and clean framework for future study
on extending well-known results on influence maximization to real-world marketing problems.
5.1 Summary of contributions
We summarize our contributions in this thesis by grouping them according to the main tasks
(findings) toward this thesis. This thesis adheres to the following three steps, 1) we start with
the conjecture that node selection policy plays a critical part in improving the rate of adoption
within a duopoly market besides the marketing budget, 2) The prior arts in this research area led
us to design a framework to study an extension of the classical influence maximization problem,
by introducing a strong adversary, and 3) Given the intuition observed from the preliminary
results, we developed the value based node selection policy which exhibits a niche seeking
behavior in this thesis.
1. Observations:
· We discovered that the budget level is of less significant in improving the number of
adopters in the specific network topology that we experimented.
· We proved that the proposed value based approach outperforms the conventional
”greedy” count based approach because the former exhibits a niche-seeking behavior.
2. Models:
· An utility based influence propagation model (which extends the classical utility func-
tion based model by [6]) is proposed to represent the decision making process of con-
sumers within an influence social network.
· A game theoretic framework to study a duopoly competition with imbalance budget
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levels under network influence effects. This framework allows other form of network
topology to be evaluate under similar experimental settings to determine if the niche-
seeking value approach is applicable to garner a larger amount of adopters.
3. Algorithms:
· We designed the value based approach, an algorithm for targeting specific nodes via
niche-seeking within an influence network that allows the neighboring nodes to reinforce
the adoption decision of specific nodes.
5.2 Limitations of Thesis
Although this thesis has reached its objectives, there were some limitations on the current
framework and models. Firstly, this research was conducted using directed acyclic influence
network of 100 nodes. The current network size may need to be expanded to generalize our
current conclusions to cover wider range of social networks. Secondly, the decision of each
node (customer) is currently depends solely on the influence from her neighbors and direct
investment from the players. Other logical factors such as user requirement, product/ service
quality and cost can be included in the model to reflect a more realistic decision making process
of consumers. Thirdly, the number future time periods to be included in the adversarial model
(termed as the look-ahead time periods is currently treated as a strategy parameter. Another
viable approach is to define a maximum allowable computation time as player-specific strategy
parameter, so the maximum look-ahead time periods can be applied by the player at each
decision epoch.
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5.3 Future Work
Our long term research direction is to design effective node selection policies for market player,
which allow him to maximize the number of adopters under the presence of stronger adver-
saries in large scale networks. Our goal is to develop the node selection policies which will
outperform conventional greedy based approaches, independent of the underlying utility func-
tion which govern the consumers’ decision and the network structures which link the consumer
in the community. The rationale of this lies on the process of decision making for consumer
is too complex to model and involve other fields of work in psychology, sociology and human
behavior which is highly unpredictable. The influence (propagation) networks for different
communities could be very distinctive and thus a general node selection policy which can per-
form relatively well irregardless of network structure is highly desirable.
On the way to achieve this long term research goal, we envisage the work will comprise of,
1. Analyzing the theoretical models of network structure and its evolution process,
2. Developing statistical influence propagation models and algorithms to efficiently evaluate
the decision game tree, for pruning less promising game tree branch
3. Extend the model to encapsulate the stochasticity of human behavior in decision making
process by incorporating probability to influence propagation models
We believe that this goal is achievable given that game theoretical models can be applied to
predict the general decision strategies of players under fictitious play, and this allows various
other forms of network structures to be evaluated extensively. An enhancement for the current
value based node selection policy can be designed after gaining greater understanding of the
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characteristics inherited within each specific classes of network structure through theoretical
models. In this thesis, we have undertake the first step towards achieving this goal by con-
structed the fundamental building blocks for studying the competition between market players
with different capability under the network influence effects.
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